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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IVAN JENKINS,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.
C~~RLES

Case No. 15905
M. PARRISH,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action which was commenced by Plaintiff against
several defendants alleging medical malpractice in the performance of open-heart surgery.

Plaintiff claimed that as a result

of Defendant's negligence he sustained permanent damage to his
brain resulting in various physical impairments.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Prior to trial all defendants, except for Dr. Charles M.
Parrish, were dismissed by stipulation of the parties.

A jury

trial was commenced on September 19, 1977 with the Honorable
Peter F. Leary presiding.

After nine days of hearings the jury

returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendant Parrish and
against Plaintiff.

The trial court subsequently denied Plain-
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tiff's motion for a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Parrish seeks affirmance of the jury verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts as presented in Appellant's brief·,L,
in the opinion of Respondent, totally inadequate in that it presents argument rather than a factual development of this case.
For this reason, Respondent offers the following Statement of
Facts as developed in trial.
The plaintiff, Ivan Jenkins, testified that after

droppi~

out of high school he joined the army and then in 1951 commenced
(Tr., p. 1261).

work with Kennecott Copper.

For the next 20

years he worked mostly labor jobs including being a "roster"
and a "rigger".

(Tr., p. 1263).

physical climbing and exertion.

All of these jobs required
(Tr. , p. 12 6 3) •

Jenkins stated that in 1965 or 1966 he began experiencing
problems with his chest.

The pain originated below his chest

and continued to increase in severity.

At one point he could

not walk SO yards across the parking lot without having severe
pain.

(Tr., p. 1304).
Dr. Owen G. Reese, a Kennecott physician, recalled that as

early as 1966 the plaintiff had complained of chest pains.

It

was not until 1971, however, that the doctor was able to diagnose
the pain as a true angina.

cTr., p. 1774) ·

1

Dr. Reese hospi-
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talized the plaintiff in 1971 for testing as to the exact cause
of the plaintiff's pain.

(Tr., p. 1775).

Dr. Reese called Dr. Parrish and asked him to conduct an arteriogram.

(Tr., p. 1775).

Defendant Dr. Parrish explained

that in January of 1972 he performed selective coronary angiography in which dye is injected into the blood and x-rays are
taken.

The angiograph showed severe occlusive triple vessel co-

ronary disease.

(Tr., p. 1565).

Plaintiff and his wife related that Dr. Parrish subsequently
informed them as to the risks of the bypass surgery and told them
that Plaintiff should have a good chance of survival because of
his age and habits.

(Tr., p. 792, 1268).

The plaintiff and his wife shortly thereafter decided to
go ahead with the operation and the plaintiff was sent to the
hospital to have blood drawn for a c.ross match.
was checked into the hospital on February 20.

The plaintiff
(Tr., p. 1567).

That night Dr. Parrish explained to the plaintiff and his wife
the extent and nature of the operation.

(Tr., pp. 1568, 1270).

On February 21 at 7:30 a.~. the plaintiff was taken into
the Holy Cross Hospital operating room.

(Tr., pp. 912-913).

Dr. Parrish testified that the surgical team operating on the
plaintiff consisted of himself, the chief surgical resident, Dr.
Parrish's own nurse, two additional nurses supplied by the hospital, a circulating nurse, the anesthesiologist, and the pump
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technician.

(Tr., p. 1586.

Morphine was used as the anesthesia during the operation.

The anesthesiologist maintained and monitored the blood pr es sun
of the plaintiff up until the time the heart-lung machine was
activated.

(Tr., pp. 906-809).

Dr. Parrish then described the remainder of the operation.
Veins were removed from a superficial venous system in the legs.
The chest was then opened and the heart was exposed.

Plastic

tubes were then attached to various areas of the heart and to
the femoral artery.

During the preceding process the plain-

tiff's heart was still pumping.

The heart-lung machine was

then primed with blood, evacuated of all air, and the machine
activated by the pump technician.

w<

The heart-lung machine began

to circulate the blood in place of the heart and to cool the
blood as it circulated.

As the body temperature dropped the

heart slowed its beat and finally an ice saline solution was
poured over the heart and within a matter of seconds the heart
stopped beating.

(Tr., pp. 1590-1592).

The body temperature

at this point was approximately 30 to 34 degrees centigrade.
(Tr., p. 1591).
Mr. Charles Dyson, a Los Angeles pump technician testifying for Plaintiff, explained that the machine acts in place of
the heart during the operation; that is, it circulates the ~
tient' s blood through the arteries and veins and at the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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time oxygenates the blood.

(Tr. , p. 113 7) •

Dr. Parrish explained that the blood coming from the venous system is blue whereas the blood going through the arterial
system is red.

(Tr., pp. 1626-1627).

A TV-screen type of os-

cilloscope is attached to the patient which monitors both the
arterial pressure and the venous pressure.

(Tr., pp. 899-900).

Dr. Parrish stated that two units of blood were used during
the operation:

the first unit for priming of the pump to com-

pensate for the machine itself and the second unit to compensate for internal pooling and loss of blood.

(Tr., p. 1658).

Using the veins from the plaintiff's leg, Dr. Parrish
fashioned three grafts to circumvent the blocked arteries
which supplied blood to the plaintiff's heart muscle.
After the operation was completed the heart-lung machine
increased the temperature of the blood circulating through the
body until such time as the temperature was high enough to allow
the heart to be shocked back into operation.
1643).

(Tr., pp. 1597,

The operation of Plaintiff was completed at 12:45 p.m.

(Tr., p. 913).
The plaintiff was then placed into the intensive care unit
of the hospital where his vital signs continued to be monitored.
At 7:10 p.m. that night the plaintiff's blood pressure severely
dropped.

At that time Dr. Parrish ordered two drugs to be admin-

istered in order to increase the blood pressure.

(Tr., PP· 1029-

1030) .
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On the day following the operation the plaintiff's cond1.
tion had stabilized.

(Tr., p. 1610).

The plaintiff remained

in the intensive care unit for five days until he was subsequently taken to a private room.

(Tr. , p. 7 9 7) .

Plaintiff claimed at trial that he immediately noticed visual problems upon awakening from the surgery.

(Tr., p. 1271),

Plaintiff's wife verified that her husband was complaining about
his vision immediately after the surgery.

(Tr., p. 795).

She

stated that during the rest of his stay at the hospital he

co~

stantly complained about his vision.

She

(Tr., pp. 795-799).

testified that Dr. Parrish was informed of this fact but merely
assured them that the plaintiff's system was in a state of shock
and would be all right after it had recovered.

(Tr., p. 797).

Plaintiff called several friends, relatives, and business
associates who testified tha.t during his stay at the hospital
and immediately after his return to his home the plaintiff com·
plained about vision problems.

(Tr., pp. 1092, 1247, 1253,

1441, 1540).

Defendant Dr. Parrish stated that the first time he knew
that the plaintiff had a neurological problem was in April of
1972, approximately six weeks after the operation.

He could

, about his
not recall any complaints that Plaintiff ma d e to hl.Jll
eyesight while in the hospital.

(T r.' p. 8 5 o) .

The doctor sta·

ted that had Plaintiff told him of any visual or coordination
problems he would have been very concerned as to the question

-6-
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of neurological damage.

(Tr., pp. 851-852).

Defendants called Dr. Owen Reese , the Kennecott p hysician
· ·
who had cared for Plaintiff during his employment, and asked
him if Plaintiff had made any complaints concerning his vision
or coordination during office visits in February and March of
1972.

The doctor replied that his records showed no such com-

plaints and that his memory also was barren of any such complaints.

(Tr., pp. 1776-1777).

The defendant called Donna Jorgensen, an LPN who worked at
Holy Cross in 1972, who testified that she could recall the
plaintiff making no complaints to her and that had such complaints
been made they would have been charted.
such notations.

The records revealed no

(Tr . , p . 1 7 6 6 ) .

Likewise, Sister Mary Agnes Mullen explained that she was
a registered nurse in charge of patient relations in 1972.

She

was assigned to the intensive care and post intensive care units
and met with the patients and their families one to three times
a day.

She could not recall Plaintiff or his wife making any

complaints as to his condition.

(Tr., pp. 1768-1770).

The hos-

pital records, which were admitted into evidence, also reflected
no comments made by the nursing staff concerning Plaintiff's
vision or coordination.

(Exhibit 13-D, "Nursing Clinical Sum-

maries".)
Plaintiff testified that since the operation he experienced
blurred vision , a weakness in his right arm, a loss of equilibrium,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a speech problem, and an inability to get along with hi's f
and family.

(Tr., pp. 1278-1280).

riends

His wife related her hus-

band's coordination problems, vision problems, speech problems,
and irritability.

(Tr., pp. 809:;-813).

Various other witnesses

called by Plaintiff substantiated this behavior.

(Tr· ' PP. 109).

1093, 1248, 1255).
On cross-examination the plaintiff stated that he had gone
fishing five or six times after the operation, had gone deer
hunting twice and had shot one deer, was still bowling, and
still had a Utah driver's license.

(Tr. , pp. 12 9 7-13 0 5) .

Dr. Parrish testified that he had examined the plaintiff
in April and July of 1972 and February of 1973.

(Tr., p. 860),

By February of 1973 it became apparent that the plaintiff was
suffering from a neurological problem.

(Tr., p. 863).

The plaintiff introduced the video-tape deposition of Dr.
William Hoyt, a neuro-opthalmologist from San Francisco (Tr., p.
1218--testimony has not been transcribed for this appeal) and
the deposition testimony of Dr. Ward Woods, a San Diego, California surgeon with a specialty in neurology and neurosurgery.
(Tr., pp. 1474-1536).

Both Dr. Hoyt and Dr. Woods described to

the jury the neurological reasons for the symptoms suffered by
the plaintiff.
· sue
It was the cause of these symptoms that comprised the is

in this case.

. , £f's
Defendant Dr. Parrish contended that Plainti
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neurological damage probably resulted from a stroke suffered
after the plaintiff had left the hospital.

'T
c r · , pp. 6 l B, 6 3 2) •

He explained that the symptoms could also have been caused by
a particle of a blood clot from the heart being pumped to the
brain during or after the surgery--a normal risk of such a surgical procedure.

(Tr., p. 1026).

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the neurological problem was caused during the surgery because of a failure
to properly operate the heart-bypass pump in a manner which
provided sufficient oxygen to Plaintiff's brain cells.
Extensive testimony from both sides was heard as to the
technical aspects necessary for a successful heart bypass operation.

Without going into detail, Plaintiff called Charles Dyson,

a certified Los Angeles pump technician, who stated that the records concerning Plaintiff's operation showed improper use of
the machine and that the procedure followed by the defendant
and his pump technician did not meet the minimum standard of
care required in 1972.

(Tr., pp. 1108-1186).

Dr. Charles Bailey, a heart surgeon residing in New Jersey,
also reviewed the procedure utilized in Plaintiff's operation
and concluded that Defendant had failed to properly utilize the
heart-lung machine thereby causing a deficient oxygen flow to
the brain during the operation.

(Tr., pp. 1306-1419).

A detailed analysis of the testimony of both .Mr. Dyson and
Dr. Bailey will be presented ;.n Point II of the argument section
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of this brief concerning the adrnissibili ty of testimony as to
the standard of care.
Dr. Hoyt, during his video-tape deposition also stated~~
in his opinion Plaintiff's brain damage was caused by hypoxia
during the open-heart surgery. , Dr. Ward Woods voiced his opinic:
that the neurological damage was caused during the operation.
(Tr. , p. 15 0 5) .
Dr. Parrish, ~m the other hand, testified that the operaticr
was perforrned in a safe manner and in accordance with the stan·
dard of care prevailing in 1972 and justified all procedures
used in the surgery.

(Tr. , pp. 8 7 8-10 3 8) .

Dr. Richard Hughes, a cardiovascular surgeon practicing ir.
Los Angeles, testified that Dr. Parrish performed the surgery
in accordance with the standards of practice generally accepted
in 1972.

(Tr., pp. 1669-1735).

Finally, Dr. Russell Nelson, a cardiovascular surgeon prac·
ticing in Salt Lake City, disputed the claimed errors made by
Plaintiff as to the correct procedure followed by Dr. Parrish
and explained that Dr. Parrish operated in accordance with t~
standard prevailing in 1972.

(Tr., pp. 1736-1763).

After nine days of trial the matter was submitted to the
jury.

A unanimous verdict was returned in favor of the defenda;

and against the plaintiff.

(Tr., pp. 1891-1892).

·
for New Triai
On March 22, 1978,Plaintiff argued his Motion
or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

(Tr., pp. 546-582).
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Both motions were denied.

(R., p. 529).

Plaintiff now appeals from the judgment on the verdict and
from the denial of these motions.

(R., p. 531).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS VENIREMAN
EDDINS FOR CAUSE.
A.
Based Upon the Examination of Jurors, the Trial Court
Properly Exercised its Discretion in Refusing to Dismiss venireman Eddins for Cause.
It is universally recognized that it is the prerogative of
the trial judge to examine and pass on the qualification of jurors including their credibility as to their qualification.
State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 806

(Utah 1977) (J. Crockett, dis-

senting).
Matters of possible juror bias or prejudice rest within
the sound discretion of the trial court.
P.2d 318

(Utah 1977).

State v. Dixon, 560

The ruling of a trial court concerning a

prospective juror will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous
or where there has been an abuse of judicial discretion.
Amodei, 563 P.2d 440

(Kan. 1977).

State v.

With this standard in mind

an examination of the record clearly shows that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss Venireman
Eddins.
During the examination of the prospective juror panel the

-11-
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trial court first asked whether any of the J'urors would

to follow the Court's instruction regardless of the J'uror•
sonal belief.

No venireman responded.

f

re use

s Per.

(Tr., p. 674).

The court then asked the veniremen whether an;_r of them

if chosen as a juror would not try the case solely upon the evi·
dence adduced before them and the witnesses which appeared before them.

None of the veniremen replied.

(Tr., p. 675),

The court then proceeded to ask the veniremen if any of
them knew the prospective witnesses or parties.

Venireman Hud-

son stated that he was acquainted with two of Plaintiff's witne:
ses and may be influenced because they were good friends.
p. 678).

(Tr.,

Venireman Hudson was then asked by the court if it

developed during the evidence that the testimony of his friend
was obviously wrong in light of other evidence whether he would
still believe the testimony of the friend even knowing that tne
testimony was obviously wrong.
I don't know.

Venireman Hudson replied, "God,

It's hard to say, Judge Leary, Your Honor."

The trial court then asked Venireman Hudson,
Well, would you be able to--if the testimony
was either wrong or erroneous, and you knew
that individual who testified--to be able to
put aside your acquaintanceship with them and
to render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the evidence?
VENIREMAN HUDSON:
I really don't know.
I
really don't know.
It's just the way it influences me.
(Tr., p. 680).
Venireman Eddins, the person now in question 1 stated that

-12-
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she also knew one of the plaintiff's witnesses, Dr. Robert
Wray.

(Tr., p. 678).

This Court should note that the plain-

tiff's statement in his brief that Mrs. Eddins was a personal
acquaintance of one of the "defendant's" expert witnesses is
therefore obviously incorrect.
pp. 660-661).

(Appellant's brief, p. 12; Tr.,

When Venireman Eddins was asked whether her ac-

quaintanceship with Plaintiff's witness would cause her to give
more weight to his testimony she replied, "No, I would be fair
and impartial as far as knowing Dr. Wray is concerned."

(Tr.,

p. 68 0) •
A third venireman, Mrs. Timothy, stated that she also knew
one of Plaintiff's witnesses and stated that she would be able
to fairly hear the evidence in spite of this acquaintanceship.
(Tr., p. 681).

Finally, Venireman Hewett stated he had employed

Mr. Fairbourn previously as his attorney.

(Tr., p. 676).

The court then asked the veniremen whether any of them had
a belief that a case of this nature should not be brought into
court for deterrnination by a jury.
Hewett both raised their hands.

Venireman Birkner and James

(Tr., p. 681).

The court then asked the venire..~en if any of there had any
belief or feeling toward any of the parties, attorneys or witnesses that might be regarded as a bias or prejudice for one or
against any of them.

None of the veniremen responded.

(Tr., PP·

681-682).
The court then asked several other questions including wheSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ther any of the veniremen had ever been sued or whethe

r a

lar claim had been presented against them or any member
friends or famili'es.

(Tr · ' pp · 683 - 684) .

venireman
·

.

SlJni-

of theu

Eddins re-

plied, "My ex-husband was a veternarian and had one case."
p. 684).

(Tr.,

No further discussion ~oncerning her relationship

with her ex-husband or the nature of the case was entered into
by the court or requested by counsel.
Next, the court inquired whether any members of the venire·
men had family or close friends with special training in medicfr
Mrs. Eddins replied that her father was an M.D., Venireman Hewet
replied that her uncle was a radiobiologist, Mr. Gardner repliec
his mother-in-law was a nurse, Mrs. McDonald replied her daught1
was a nurse, Mrs. Birkner replied that her cousin was a nurse,
and Mrs. McRoberts replied that her sister was a nursing studem.
(Tr., p. 684).

In addition, Venireman Hilton responded that

her niece was a radiologist, and Venireman Nelson stated that
she had worked as a nu=se's aide for nine years.

(Tr., p. 685).

Finally, the court, in closing, asked if there was any

~t

son that had occurred to any of the veniremen during question·
ing that might make them doubtful that they would be completely
fair and impartial in this case.

Mrs. Eddins replied, "The fac:

my father was an M.D. I'm sure would influence me."

(Tr., P·

689) •

A hearing was held in chambers before the court and with
various veniremen as to their qualifications.

In chambers Mr.
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Fairbourn, Plaintiff's co-counsel, stated that, "Mrs. Eddins
has indicated that her father is a physician and that she has
stated that she believes that she would be unduly biased and
prejudiced by this fact."

The court replied, "Well, r didn't

pursue that matter with her."

(Tr., p. 689a).

In addition, Plaintiff challenged the qualifications of
venireman Birkner and Venireman James Hewett who had told the
court that they believed this type of case should not be brought.
(Tr., p. 689a).

Finally, Mr. Slagle, attorney for Defendant,

requested that he be able to examine Mr. Ardin Hewett as to his
attorney-client relationship with Mr. Fairbourn.

(Tr., p. 690).

The court accordingly asked each venireman to come into
chambers individually.

Venireman Birkner stated that she did

not think that malpractice actions should be brought because
doctors do the best they can.

She stated that ·she had read ar-

ticles about malpractice and does not believe in medical malpractice cases.

(Tr., pp. 691-692).

Venireman James Hewett stated that the plaintiff was obviously needing medical attention or would not have asked for
it and that it must have been successful because the plaintiff
was still alive.

(Tr., p. 693).

Venireman James Hewett then

stated that he was not sure that anyone had the right to bring
a malpractice action and that his attitude would remain the same
even if the doctor was shown to be negligent.

-15-

lTr.,

P· 6951.
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Venireman Ardin Hewitt was then interviewed by the court
and stated that he had once employed Mr. Fairbourn in a child
custody case.

He stated that this would not have an effect

upon his ability to weigh evidence.

He stated that he could

listen to the evidence and give a fair and impartial verdict.
(Tr., pp. 696-697).
Both Veniremen Birkner and Venireman James Hewett were cha:.
lenged by Plaintiff for cause.

(Tr . , pp • 6 9 2 , 6 9 6 ) •

Venireman Eddins was then called into the court's chambers
for examination.

This dialogue between Mrs. Eddins and the

court has been partially quoted in Appellant's brief and Appellant has emphasized various statements made by her.
brief, pp. 13-14).

(Appellant''

Respondent believes that other statements

are equally important and should be emphasized and that some of
the crucial testimony was omitted.

The following dialogue oc-

curred between Mrs. Eddins and the court:
THE COURT: Sit down, Mrs. Eddins.
I just
want to make some inquiry as to some of
your qualifications to serve. One of the
things I'm a little bit concerned with is
your response as to whether there was anything that would make you think that you
might not be a fair and impartial juror in
this matter.
You indicated that--the fact
that your father either was or had been an
M.D.-VENIREMAN EDDINS:

Yes.

THE COURT: You thought this might, for
one reason or another, influence your determination in connection with this matter.
I suppose maybe I ought to ask you:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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•

Because of your father being a medical doctor, would you be inclined to give more
weight to the testimony of a medical"d;"ctor
simply because he's a medical doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:

I think I probably would.

THE COURT:
Would you give less weight to
his testimony?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:

No.

THE COURT: Would you be inclined to give
more weight to the testimony of--well, perhaps
I'd better not ask it that way. Even though
your father is a medical doctor, do I understand that you do not believe that you would
be able to listen to the evidence and based
thereon render a fair and impartial verdict?
Or, let me put it another way: Do you think
if you were selected as a juror that you
would be able to listen to the evidence and
based thereon render a fair and impartial
verdict?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:
I definitely believe they
can make mistakes.
I would hope I could listen to it.
But I know I would be somewhat
partial to the doctor.
THE COURT: Well, are you telling me that
you would give more weight to the testimony
which would be presented on behalf of the
defendant in this action simply because he
happens to be a medical doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I think I could weigh
the evidence.
I think when it got to his
personal testimony that would be the only
time it would possibly influence me, and I
would feel it was more likely to be truthful
than untruthful.
THE COURT: And I take it, then, your answer
would be that you would give more weight to
his testimony simply because he's a doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:

I'm afraid so.
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THE COURT: Would you give less weight to
his testimony because he's a doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:

No.

THE COURT:
If the evidence indicated that
the doctor's testimony was not in accordance
with the evidence, would you still be inclined
to give more weight to his testimony simply
because he was a doctor?
VENIREMAN EDDINS:

No, I think I could see it.

THE COURT:
I'll ask it this way:
I think
you've answered the question, ma'am, but do
you think that actions such as this should
not be brought against--not be brought?
VENIREMAN EDDINS: No, I don't think they
shouldn't be brought.
THE COURT: Do you think that they, if the
situation warranted such an action, would
be appropriate?
VENIREMAN EDDINS: Certainly.
701) (Emphasis added).

(Tr., pp. 699-

Subsequently, the veniremen panel was brought back into
court at which time Plaintiff moved to dismiss Venireman Bir~
and James Hewett for cause.
709).

This motion was granted.

(Tr., P

Defendant moved to dismiss Venireman Hudson for cause a

this motion was granted.
Mrs. Eddins was denied.

(Tr., p. 710) •

The motion to dismi:

(Tr. , p. 7 0 9) •

The preceding review of the venire examination reveals
that the court carefully examined the panel as to every facet
of possible bias or prejudice.

The court felt that two

oft~

veniremen were not qualified to serve because of their prejud:
·
·
·
·
against b ringing
a ma 1 prac t ice
ac t ion.

The court also felt t:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

one of the veniremen could not render a fair verdict in light
of his relationship with a witness.

On the other hand, the court

ruled that Mrs. Eddins was a qualified juror based upon her response to the questioning.
The trial court was correct in this ruling.

Plaintiff ne-

ver challenged Mrs. Eddins or inquired further into the fact
that her ex-husband who was a veternarian had been previously
involved in an action.

(Tr., p. 689).

The fact that Mrs. Ed-

dins was a personal acquaintance of one of Plaintiff's proposed
expert witnesses, Dr. Robert Wray, can hardly be said to be prejudicial to Plaintiff.
Likewise, the fact that Mrs. Eddins' father was a physician
was not challenged per se any more than the other veniremen who
stated they had relatives who were also in the medical field.
The only basis for such a challenge was Mrs. Eddins' own statements made to the court.

An examination of these statements

revealed no abuse in the court's discretion.
First, the fact that Mrs. Eddins stated she would be inclined
to give more weight to the testimony of ~ medical doctor because
he's a medical doctor would not adversely affect Plaintiff any
more than Defendant since Plaintiff called three medical doctors
himself.

(Tr., p. 699).

Second, Mrs. Eddins stated that she could weight the evidence but that she thought it more likely a doctor would be truthful than untruthful.
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The court in Wheeler v. State, 362 So.2d 377 (Fla. App.
1978} faced a similar claim that a juror was disqualified because of her stateffients.

The court therein stated:

No prejudicial error appears in the trial
court's denial of Appellant's challenge
for cause of a prospective juror whom Appellant later struck peremptorily.
The
prospective juror simply stated that she
had great respect for police officers and
that it would be difficult for her to believe that a police officer had testified
untruthfully.
That feeling did not disqualify the prospective juror.
Id. at
378.
(Emphasis added}.
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fif~

Circuit held that the statement of a prospective juror that he
would give more credibility to an F.B.I. agent than to any othe:
witness did not constitute grounds for reversal.

United States

v. Cross, 474 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss a pros·
pective juror whose husband was a law enforcement officer and
who stated that she would be more inclined to believe a law en·
forcement officer than other witnesses.
978

State v. Qualls, 353 Sc.

(La. 1977).
Finally, the Florida Appellate Court in Williams v. Nowlis

297 So.2d 82

(Fla. App. 1974) held that the trial court erred

in dis:rr.issing prospective jurors who said they would give more
weight to the testimony of a physician than a chiropractor.
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court stated:
It is, of course, a juror's prerogative to
the weight and believability he
will accord to a particular witness's testimony, and he makes that determination from
various factors including his general knowledge.
If a juror in the final analysis after
hearing the testimony can make that determination based upon his understanding of such factors, he should not be stricken for cause.
Of course, questions on voir dire may uncover
such prejudice on the part of a juror that he
could not fairly make such a determination,
but here the questions asked the juror did
not go far enough or to the point of uncovering prejudice. A judgment based upon a
juror's understanding of the qualifications
of an expert witness in a particular field
based upon his common sense, judgment and
experience is not prejudice.
It is his duty
and responsibility to make such determination.
Id. at 83-84.
d~termine

Venireman Eddins clearly stated that if a doctor's testimony was not in accordance with the evidence she would not be
inclined to give more weight to his testimony simply because
he was a doctor.

She also stated that she believed malpractice

actions should be brought and that if they were warranted they
would be certainly appropriate.

(Tr • , p • 7 0 l ) •

Each party exercised four peremptory challenges because
of the addition of an alternate juror.

One of Plaintiff's chal-

lenges was applied to Mrs. Eddins who, of course, did not serve
on the jury panel.
Mrs. Eddins was obviously candid in her answers and the
trial court, who watched her demeanor and heard her testimony,

-21-
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did not abuse its discretion in deci'di'ng
th a t
-

s h e would be a

qualified juror.

B.

The Authorities Cited by Appellant are Distinguishabl,
~

Appellant cites several Utah cases in support of his pos~
tion that Venireman Eddins should have been dismissed from the
panel.

The Crawford v. Manning case, 542 P. 2d 1091 (Utah 1975)

involved a potential juror who stated that "She had strong feelings concerning anyone who would sue to recover money for the
death of another."

This testimony was similar to that given by

Venireman Birkner and Venireman James Hewett (Tr., pp. 602-695)
to which the trial court sustained Plaintiff's challenge for
cause.

(Tr. , p. 7 0 9) •

In State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629

(Utah 1977) the prospec-

tive juror stated, "I feel very strongly against people that
or sell narcotics.
verdict or not."

UH

I don't know whether I could be fair in a
Again, the prospective juror in that case was

prejudiced against the type of action being brought.

In this

case, however, Mrs. Eddins stated that a malpractice action was
perfectly appropriate and that they should be brought in appropriate cases.

(Tr., p. 701).

Finally, the case of State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah
1977) involved potential jurors who were personal friends of two
of the prosecution witnesses.

This Court held that the record

· " rat h er than
a mere "ac·
indicated that there was a "friendship
.
quaintance."

The trial court in this case believed that Mr.
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Hudson had such a friendship relationship with the plaintiff's
witnesses and accordingly dismissed him for cause.

(T r., p. 710) •

This review of Plaintiff's authorities clearly shows that
the facts in each case must be examined and that the trial court
must be given a large amount of discretion in determining whether a prospective juror is qualified.

In this case the record

shows that the trial court thoughtfully and carefully questioned
numerous prospective jurors as to a variety of potential conflicts and in fact concluded that three of the prospective jurors were not qualified.
The trial court followed this Court's direction in the
three previously cited cases and dismissed veniremen for those
reasons stated in this Court's opinions.

For this reason, there

was no error committed by the trial court in the selection of
the jury.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RULINGS REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY BY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES.
A.
The Trial Court Properly Excluded Certain Portions of
Testimony in Which Foundation was Lacking.
This case was tried in September of 1977.

It concerned an

operation which had taken place in February of 1972.

The trial

court properly applied the law as it existed at the time the
action arose and at the time of trial.
In August of 1978 this Court decided Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d
814 (Utah 1978) where the majority held that the local community
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standard should be changed to encompass a " s1m1
· · 1 ar " community
standard with regard to expert testimony.
It is manifestly unfair to hold that a trial court has
erred in its rulings concerning a standard which was in existence at the time of the trial because of a subsequent change
in the standard by a higher court.

The decision in ~ is un·

clear as to whether the new standard is applicable to actions
arising prior to the decision.

Respondent respectfully sub-

mits that Swan should be given only prospective effect and
should not apply to causes of action or, at the very minimum,
to trials which occurred prior to the rendering of the decision.
This Court in numerous decisions has constantly held that
rights, duties, and privileges should generally be changed only
by the legislature or in rare instances by this Court; but

ili~

in every case fair notice must be given to those who relied
upon previous law.

Rubalcava v. Gissmann, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah

1963); Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464 P.2d
596 (Utah 1970); State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmer's
Insurance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972); Brunyer v. Sall
Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 564
P.2d 303 (1977); State v. Kelbach, 565 P.2d 700 (1977).
Thus, any application of the strict locality rule by the
trial court was not error since it conformed with the law exist·
ing at the time of trial and the time the claim arose.
tiff's claim at this time is therefore without merit.
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Plain·

Even assuming, arguendo, that the "similar community"
standard should have been applied by the trial court, the plaintiff failed to establish that either Los Angeles, California,
the city in which Mr. Dyson the pump technician practiced, or
Belmar, New Jersey, the city in which Dr. Bailey, the cardiovascular surgeon practiced, were "similar" to Salt Lake City.
The Swan decision contains five separate opinions of the
Justices of this Court.

Justice Crockett in a special concur-

ring opinion stated the requirement of foundation as to a "similarity" in communities:

Justice Crockett stated:

IIJt is also appreciated that in other specialized aspects of the practice of medicine,
there are in fact different standards in different localities.
In larger metropolitan
areas where there are educational institutions, hospitals and clinics, so that there
are available more advanced facilities and
equipment, and higher degrees of specialization in particular fields, and higher earnings for practitioners, there are undoubtedly
higher standards than in less favored areas.
When this fact situation has a bearing on
the problem involved, that is an important
factor to be taken into account.
584 P.2d
at 819.
Justice Wilkins, in a concurring opinion, quoted an authority
which also outlined the rule for foundational requirement.
rule states the following:
[!Jn determining similarity the courts will
not now look to such socio-economic facts as
population, type of economy, and income level
but to factors more directly relating to the
practice of medicine.
In the main, an expert
practicing in a locality having medical faSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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This

cilities comparable to those existing in the
defendant's community is permitted to testify
concerning the standard of care governing the
defendant.
The number and quality of hospitals, laboratories and medical schools are
typical considerations.
584 P.2d 820.
The record is void of any comparisons between Salt Lake
City's facilities, medical school, etc. with those of Los Angelo
California and Belmar, New Jersey.

Thus, even assuming argue~

that the similar community standard should have been applied by
the trial court, even though it was not the applicable law at
the time of trial, the plaintiff still failed to establish a
proper foundation and any objections were rightfully sustained,
In addition, unlike the Swan case, the plaintiff here made
no proffer of proof as to what the witnesses would have said hac
the objections not been sustained.

Such proffer is necessacyil

omission in testimony is claimed as error.
Walston, 289 A.2d 804

Sun Cab Company v,

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).

B.
The Testimony of Mr. Charles Dyson and Dr. Charles
Bailey Amply Covered the Alleged Negligence and Failure to Meet
Standards of the Defendant and Therefore any Exclusion of Testimony was Harmless Error.
Plaintiff makes the following statement in his brief:
Had the plaintiff's witness (Mr. Charles Dyson)
been allowed to testify as to the standard of
care in locales similar to Salt Lake City, Utah,
he would have given testimony that would have
shown that the defendant doctor's care of the
plaintiff fell far below the existing and recognized standard of care in similar localities
with respect to operation of the heart-lung bypass pump machine. By refusing to allow such
testimony, the plaintiff was prevented from presenting to the jury the very heart of his case.
(Appellant's brief, p. 25).
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An examination of the record, however, shows that Mr. Dyson
repeatedly gave his opinion as to a breach of standard committed
by the defendant.
Mr. Dyson stated that in his opinion there was a standard
of practice among perfusion technicians throughout the country
in February of 1972.

(Tr., p. 1109).

He testified that if the

pump head was not adjusted for occlusion each time the tubing
was changed that this would be a departure from the standard
of practice of a capable, competent pump technician in accordance with minimum standards in 1972.

(Tr., p. 1116).

He

claimed that a capable, competent pump technician of 1972 should
have understood the physiology of flow rates and should have
known that the recorded flow rate of 1,100 cc's (as recorded by
Defendant's pump technician during Plaintiff's operation) was
completely erroneous.

He also said that a capable, competent

pump technician in 1972 should have been aware of certain laws
of physiology as to minimum flow rate at various body temperatures.
(Tr., p. 1127).
In addition to these statements Mr. Dyson was also questioned
by Plaintiff's attorney as to the following opinions:

Q

Do you have an opinion as to what the
minimum standard of practice required
with regard to observing and recording
flow rates under these circumstances,
sir?

A

The flow rates should have been observed and recorded by the technician.
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Q

Can you explain why in your opinion
the flow rates should be observed and
recorded during the course of the pump
run?

A

I just don't know how you can tell
what you're doing if you don't know
what you're flowing.
Obviously, in a
state of no'flow, that's what we call
death.
Now, you come above no flow
and you get in a range that may support life and may not support life.
Now, how do you know that the patient
was getting an adequate amount of arterialized blood unless you record it?
Or, how can you ever say the patient
was getting an adequate amount of arterialized blood?
(Tr., p. 1180).

The witness also related that the minimum standard of tech·
nicians in 1972 required that the temperature be recorded every
10 minutes and that the standard required that the blood pressur:
be recorded every 10 to 15 minutes.

(Tr., p. 1181).

Mr. Dyson stated that the average surgical team would use

a higher flow rate than that which was used by Defendant upon
the plaintiff.

(Tr., p. 1182).

He testified that the flow rate

which was used on the plaintiff was the very lowest minimum star:
dard and that at such a rate a blood gas sample should have been
obtained to determine if sufficient oxygen was going into the
blood.

(Tr • , p • 118 2 ) •

The preceding review amply illustrates that while the court
sustained objections as to certain questions asked by Plaintiff,
numerous opinions of the witness were introduced before the jury
in terms of a "Jninbnum" standard of pump technicians in 1972.
(_Tr
• , p • 110 9 ) .
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There is no doubt, moreover, that the testimony of Dr.
Charles P. Bailey, Plaintiff's expert cardiovascular surgeon,
was superior and repetitious to the testimony of Mr. Dyson who
was merely a pump technician.

Plaintiff himself admits that

Dr. Bailey was allowed to testify as to the standard of care
practiced in Salt Lake City.

(Appellant's brief, p. 26).

The omission, therefore, of any of Mr. Dyson's testimony,
even assuming that such omission was erroneous, is not reversible error.

"Error may not be predicated upon the exclusion

of evidence which is merely cumulative and does not add materially to the weight or clarity of that already received."
Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 524 P.2d
1141, 1149

(Kan. 1974).

See also, Watkins v. Utah Poultry

and Farmers Cooperative, 251 P.2d 663 (Utah 1952).
Dr. Bailey was given a hypothetical question based upon
the facts developed in the previous testimony and asked whether
or not the care given to Plaintiff in February of 1972 "was in
accordance with the standard of care, diligence and caution
that would be expected as a minimum standard of a capable, competent, thoracic surgeon practicing in the locality of Salt Lake
City, Utah."

The doctor replied:

"My opinion is that it was

not up to the minimum acceptable standard of care.

And if you

would like, I will point out the way in which I think it wasn't
satisfactory."

(Tr., p. 1340).

Dr. Bailey then proceeded to
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describe in detail the reasons for this opinion including:
inadequate blood flow rate (Tr., p. 1341-1342); the failure
to use a rectal thermometer (Tr., p. 1344); the failure to use
an adequate flow rate based upon a correct temperature (T r.,
pp. 1345-1346); the allowance of the blood pressure to drop be·
low 50 mm's of mercury (Tr., p. 1348); and the negligence of
Defendant in relying upon blood pressure alone to monitor the
operation (Tr., pp. 1350-1351).
Finally, Plaintiff's counsel asked this question of Dr.
Bailey concerning the "pump perfusion team":

Q

Do you have an opinion as to whether the
standard of practice of a pump perfusion
team under the circumstances as we've
described in February of 1972 required
that the pump technician be aware of
what the flow rates or the blood pressure is of the patient during the course
of a pump run such as this?

*
A

*

*

At that time in medical history, as at
the present time, the vast, the accumulated opinion of doctors doing this kind
of work is that you must know what your
perfusion rate is, and that you will
maintain it at an adequate level.
(Tr.,
p. 1354).

An accurate sUillHary of Dr. Bailey's testimony is also found in
Appellant's Statement of Facts.

(Appellant's brief, PP• 7-8).

The most that Appellant can say regarding the tes

t,

l.lllO

ny of

Dr. Bailey is that "in all likelihood" the jurors viewed the
testimony as less authoritative than the Salt La k e
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c l· t Y based

expert witnesses called by Defendant.
26).

(Appellant's brief, p.

Such a claim goes to the weight of testimony, is mere spe-

culation, and does not constitute a sufficient ground for error.
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in its rulings as to the testimony of Plaintiff's expert witnesses.
POINT III
THE PROCEDURE UTILIZED IN FORMULATING AND
OBJECTING TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS WAS NOT ERRONEOUS.
There is no showing in the record that Plaintiff's attorneys were not given ample opportunity to object to the giving
and refusal to give jury instructions.

In addition, the legal

authorities cited by Plaintiff in his brief are not on point
since they do not deal with the specific question raised by the
appellant.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 28-33).

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and that it is sufficient that a party, at the time the
ruling or order of the court is made or sought, "make known to
the court the action which he desires the court to take."
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providesthat
the court shall inform counsel of its proposed action with regard to jury instruction requests prior to instructing the jury;
and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions.

All objections must be made before the instructions

are given to the jury or before the jury retires to consider its
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verdict.
Plaintiff's counsel during the argument for new trial and
judgment n. o. v. ad:mi tted that a conference had been held prior
to the formal exceptions to the,instructions before the court
reporter.

(Motion transcribed separately numbered Tr., pp.

546-582; 562-563).

Upon being asked by the court whether

Plaintiff's counsel had an opportunity to consult with the

c~rt

prior to the time the exceptions were taken, Mr. Fairbourn replied:
Part of them, not all of the instructions.
They were rather numerous instructions and
in this particular case the court indicated
to us that he had gone over the instructions
and we were given a copy of the court's
proposed instructions and we went over these
with the court.
(Tr., p. 563).
This event was apparently unreported since there is no trans·
cription of these conversations.

Mr. Slagle, counsel for Defen·

dant, stated the following concerning his recollection of the
exceptions:
It's my recollection and I think Mr. Fairbourn will bear this out, that we did not take
a lunch break that day but rather had lunch
in the courtroom. That when you came back,
which was sometime before 12:50 we sat in the
jury room in here for approximately an hour,
assembled jury instructions, went through
them with you and put them together. You
marked all of our jury instructions as to whether they were given, not given, or given in
substance. You then asked both of us whether or not, after we had gone through them
with you, whether we had any serious objections that we needed to take at that time.
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,

Now whether or not there was a court reporter, whether Mr. Midgley was in the jury
room at that tbne I don't recall. At which
time we both said Okay we told you what our
serious objections were and you then said
II
f
You can take your formal exceptions while
I get a couple of these changes typed."
(Tr . , p • 5 7 8 ) •
Thus, the record fails to show that the objections of the
Plaintiff with reference to jury instructions were not "made
known to the court."

Rule 46, U.R.C.P.

In addition, the trial court was concerned at the Motion
for a New Trial hearing that the plaintiff's counsel had not
informed the court that his absence from the formal exceptions
would be claimed as error.
As stated by the court:

(Tr., p. 566).
"I don't have any independent re-

collection of either you or Mr. Dixon shaking, rattling and
rolling me and saying if you don't do this, Judge, you're comrnitting error.

Now maybe you did but it sure did not register."

(Tr . , p • 5 6 6 ) •
The court in a further c0Jl1Illent stated to Plaintiff's counsel:
IT]he thing I'm concerned with is whether
or not, in connection with the instructions,
if you saw that I was c0Jl1Illitting an error,
and it's obvious that you're relying upon
an error that you claim that I conrrnitted,
whether or not the record reflects that you
endeavored to have me correct that error before I continued on down the merry path
that causes the problem. Now if the record
so reflects that's fine. If it doesn't it
would be a concern to me that where I have
been led into an error by -my own doing I
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thir.k there's a responsibility before counsel to so advise the court that he's conunitting an error and get it corrected.
(Tr. ,
p. 568).
The record shows no objection to the court's absence from the
formal exceptions.
Plaintiff's counsel admitted that "part" of the instructions had been discussed with the court prior to the time of
the formal exceptions.

(Tr., p. 563).

There is also no show-

ing in the record as to which specific instructions were or
were not discussed.

Unless it can be shown that counsel was

given no opportunity to discuss a particular instruction whict
is claimed to have been erroneous, any failure to provide such
opportunity is harmless error.
P.2d 832

Pagan v. Thrift City Inc., 460

(Utah 1969).

The Rules of Civil Procedure, both federal and state, do
not require that a formal, on-the-record discussion be held con·
cerning jury instructions.

pr~

The purpose of the rules is to

vide the court and counsel with an opportunity to discuss and
criticize the instructions prior to submission to the jury.
In the instant case, it is clear that such an opportuni~
was present and there is nothing in the record showing that the
trial court "refused to listen to counsel's objections."
pellant's brief, p. 30).

~~

On the contrary, it appears from the

discussion of the court and counsel during the motion for new
trial that a conference was held discussing the instructions anc
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that the trial court was not physically present during the taking
of the formal exceptions because such matters had previously been
discussed.
If Plaintiff's counsel was unhappy with this procedure, a
formal objection should have been lodged into the record stating
which instructions had not been discussed with the trial court.
This was not done and therefore Plaintiff has waived any claimed
error.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WITH RESPECT
TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Appellants complain that two instructions should not have
been given by the court (Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35) and that
two instructions were erroneously omitted by the court.
pellant's brief, p. 36).

(Ap-

Both arguments are without merit.

It is fundamental in determining the propriety of jury instructions that the instructions must be considered as a whole.
Whyte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1976).

Applying this

rule reveals that both instructions Number 12 and Number 11
were proper in light of all the instructions given by the court.
Appellant complains that Instruction Number 12 denied the
opportunity of the jury to assess the testimony of Mr. Charles
Dyson, the heart-lung by-pass pump machine technician.

Appel-

lant states:
By instructing the jury that only the testimony of expert physicians could be relied
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upon to establish the standard of care,
the jury was erroneously misled into rejecting out of hand all testimony given by the
appellant's by-pass pump machine technician.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 34-35).
Instruction Number 18 giyen by the trial court clearly
allows the testimony of Mr. Dyson to be considered in assessing the standard to be utilized by pump technicians.

This in-

struction reads:
When a physician undertakes to use an employee to operate a coronary by-pass pump
machine, he is expected to take reasonable
steps to assure that the pump technician
is properly trained and sufficiently knowledgeable under the circumstances to operate
the machine prudently and safely.
If you find that there were minimum standards of knowledge, skill, or diligence that
were customarily exercised by other pump
technicians under similar circumstances, in
February of 1972 then you must determine
whether or not in failing to have sufficient
knowledge or in failing to exercise suff icient skill or diligence as required by
those minimum standards, there was a departure and if there was any injury caused by
that departure, then Dr. Parrish is liable
for that injury.
(R., p. 465) (Emphasis
added).
As previously noted, the testimony of Mr. Dyson was to the
effect that there was a 1972 standard for pump technicians and
that this standard had been violated during the operation on
Plaintiff.

Thus, the two instructions together established~~

the standard for the physician himself and the vicarious standard for the physician employing a pump technician.

-36-
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Appellant now co.mplains about Instruction No. 11 as not
properly presenting Plaintiff's theory of the case.

Plaintiff

claims that the instructions should have informed the jury
that failure to obtain blood gas tests and to monitor the patient's temperature were additional factors which could have
resulted in negligence.
It is Plaintiff's obligation to formulate and present an
instruction of his case theory and present it to the trial court
for consideration.

The record is barren of any proposed in-

struction by Plaintiff specifically referring to blood gas or
monitoring of temperature.

(R., pp. 410-420.)

Likewise, there

is no exception in the record as to the failure of the court to
give a requested instruction by Plaintiff specifically referring
to blood gas and temperature monitoring.

(Tr., pp. 1833-1839).

As stated by this Court:
If Defendants desired instructions on defenses • • • they should propose them. Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah
1960).
This same rule is equally applicable to claims of a plaintiff.
In addition, the court in several other instructions repeatedly told the jury that the defendant would be negligent if
he failed to "exercise such care and diligence as was ordinarily
exercised by physicians and surgeons doing the same type of work
in the Salt Lake civinity or similar locality."
Numbers

s,

9, 12, and 13; R.

1

(Instructions

pp. 455, 456, 459, 460).
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Certainly, the failure to monitor blood aas
and tempe ra~
ture could be considered by the jury as the failure to

"~er

'-Jo.

.
cise

care and diligence required of physicians or required of pump
technicians.

There was

ampl~

testimony by Plaintiff's witness

that such standards, in their opinions, were breached.
pp. 1181-1183).

(Tr,,

It was, therefore, not necessary, in the ab-

sence of a specific request by Plaintiff, to include each factor of the claimed negligence in the general instruction outlining Plaintiff's case.
Finally, Plaintiff complains that his Instructions Numbers
6 and 7 concerning the credibility to be given to deposition
and video-tape testimony were wrongfully excluded.
391, 392).

Plaintiff states:

(R.' pp.

"It is likely that members of th1

jury would tend to discount testimony by deposition in comparison to live testimony from witnesses they can see and hear."
(Appellant's brief, p. 3 6} .

Such a statement is mere specula-

tion on the part of Plaintiff.

In addition, the testimony referred to in Instructions N~·
bers 6 and 7 is basically concerned with medical causation and
damages--not negligence.

Dr. William Hoyt, a San Francisco

neuro-ophthalmologist, testified on video tape as to the extent
of the damage to Plaintiff's eyesight and the fact it was pro·
bably caused by hypoxia.

Likewise, Dr. Ward Woods, a San Diego

neurosurgeon, testified by deposition as to the neurological
damage
to the plaintiff and the resulting symptoms.
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(Tr., PP·

1474-1536).
Since neither of these medical witnesses was qualified in
the area of medicine practiced by Defendant, the value of their
testimony was only to evaluate the extent of damage and to hypothesize that such damage could have been caused during openheart surgery.

However, since the jury did not reach the ques-

tion of damages, the importance of this depositional testimony
was obviously minimal.

Any error, therefore, was harmless.

For these reasons, the trial court was correct in the instructions given to the jury.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT TO AUTHENTICATE TEXTBOOKS.
Plaintiff complains that Defendant Dr. Parrish "evasively
refused to acknowledge any of the experts or "!:heir medical texts"
propounded by Plaintiff.

(Appellant's brief, p. 39).

Such a

characterization is unjustified as is shown by the record.

The

testimony of Defendant is consistent that he was either unaware
of the reputation of the offered authority, was not familiar with
their textbook, or was not familiar with the authority.
(Tr., pp. 839-846).
The defendant, on several occasions, testified that because
of the rapidly changing field his information comes mainly from
monthly periodicals and not from textbooks.

(Tr., pp. 844-845).
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Thus, with Dr. Parrish failing to recognize or authenticate

the

textbooks inquired of by Plaintiff an attempt was made to authenticate these materials through Plaintiff's own expert witness, Dr. Charles Bailey.

(R., pp. 1379-1383).

The court

properly refused to allow Dr. Bailey to authenticate these

r~

ferences for the purpose of later cross-examining Defendant
Dr. Parrish.
Plaintiff's position, as argued in his brief, is that when
an expert witness fails to recognize or authenticate a textbook
or reference the opposition should be allowed to authenticate
such textbook or reference using their own expert witnesses,
At that point, the book or reference, now authenticated, can
be used for cross examination of the opposing expert.
While this procedure has been adopted by some states, most
states still require that an authority or reference may only be
used to cross examine a witness who has specifically recognized
or depended upon such source as a basis of the witness's direct
testimony.
A few recent examples of those states following the traditional rule are as follows:

Arizona:

Purcell v. Zimbelman,

500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. App. 1972); California:
344 P.2d 428

(Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Colorado:

National Bank of Denver, 463 p.2d 882

Hope v. Arrowhead,
Ross v. Colorado

(Colo. 1969); Maryland:

Fleming v. Prince George's County, 358 A.2d 892 (Md. 1976);

-40-
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Minnesota:
New Jersey:

Rosenthal v. Kola.rs, 231 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1975);
Swank v. Halivopoulis, 260 A.2d 240 (N.J. super.

1969); New York:

Florrence v. Goldberg, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y.

A.D. 1975); and Texas:

Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.

Civil. App. 1975).
These states apply the traditional rule, followed by the
trial court, that an expert witness may only be cross examined
as to specific authorities and references he bases his opinion
upon during direct examination or as to authorities he specifically recognizes as authorities.

If the witness bases his opin-

ion solely upon his own experience and does not authenticate
any authorities he cannot be held accountable for information
contained in those authorities and therefore cannot be cross
examined about them.

32 C.J.S., Section 574, pp. 694-699.

Some states have enacted statutes which specifically allow
medical textbooks to be used as direct evidence in a malpractice
action.
N.W.

u.

See Note, "Medical Malpractice--Expert Testimony" 60
L. Rev. 834 1966; Note, "Statutory and Common Law Inno-

vations", 45 Minn. L. Rev., 1019 (1961).

In such cases the

textbook assumes the status of a live witness even though the
defense does not have the opportunity to cross examine the author.

Fortunately, Utah has not adopted this procedure.
A hybrid between the use of textbooks as direct evidence

and the requirement of authentication by the expert witness
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book may be used for cross examination i f it is authentic t

a ed b·,

the opposing party's expert.

The obvious difficulty with this

procedure is that the two experts may have wide differences in
opinion as to what is a "reputable" source or as to what is a

"widely accepted" source.
In this case, for example, had Dr. Bailey recognized and
authenticated a textbook by Dr. John Doe and had Dr. Parrish
denied that Dr. John Doe was an authority or denied that the
textbook contained correct information or disavowed any knowledg:
of either John Doe or the textbook, the jury would ultimately
be faced with the same question it was in the present trial:
Is Dr. Bailey more knowledgeable and reputable in the field of
cardiovascular surgery than is Dr. Parrish?
In other words, the authenticated textbook, in cases where
the witness disavows the author or the material, is only as good
and credible as the expert witness authenticating it.
Rather than contributing any useful information to the jury
the introduction of the intermediary textbook can only serve to
confuse them since the authenticating witness could probably
have stated the same information directly without any reference
to any textbook.
Plaintiff finally argues that such references can be admitted into evidence as "scientific books" which contain "evidence of facts of general notoriety and interest" pursuant to

-42-
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-25-6 ll953l.
brief, p. 42) ·

(Appellant's

SUch an argument is without merit since it is

patently obvious that the procedure used in open-heart surgery
does not fall into the category of how many feet are in a mile
or an actuarial table of life spans.

(Appellant's brief, p.

42).

For these reasons, the trial court was correct in excluding Dr. Bailey's testimony relating to an attempt to authenticate medical treatises which were neither relied upon nor recognized by Dr. Parrish during his direct examination
POINT VI
DR. RUSSELL NELSON WAS NEITHER A "SURPRISE"
WITNESS NOR DID HE TESTIFY IMPROPERLY.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing Dr.
Russell Nelson to testify in controvention of the pre-trial order and in rendering an opinion on matters other than rebuttal
to the testimony of Charles Dyson.

Such contention is totally

without substance.
Plaintiff asserts that Judge Baldwin in the pretrial conference required "each party to disclose all witnesses who would
be called at trial."

(Appellant's brief, p. 44).

As authority

for this proposition Appellants cite the Affidavit of Clayton
Fairbourn, co-counsel for Plaintiff.

(R., pp. 494-495).

There is no doubt that the parties exchanged the names of
witnesses during the pretrial conference as evidenced by the
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minute order of Judge Baldwin.

CB., p. 336).

There is no

record, however, supporting Plaintiff's claim that Judge Baldwin ordered that no other witnesses could be called
those exchanged at the conference.

e~cept

Defendant has adamantly

denied this assertion during and after the trial.

lTr., pp.

1739, 577).

In a conference with counsel immediately prior to the commencement of the trial, each side listed their witnesses for
the judge so that he could inform the jury as to their names.
Mr. Slagle, attorney for Defendant, listed the names of approxi-

mately ten witnesses and then stated, "At the present time that';
all the witnesses I know of.

It may be necessary, of course,

to call others, Your Honor, as the evidence develops in rebuttal."

The court replied, "I understand that."

(R., p. 660).

The court also informed the jury after reading the list of
witnesses that "it may be there are additional witnesses whom
(Tr., p. 681).

they desire to call."

Thus, even in the be-

ginning it is clear that the attorneys for the parties and t~
court were aware that witnesses other than those specifically
exchanged may be called.
Near the conclusion of the trial Dr. Russell Nelson took the
stand on behalf of the defendant.

At that time Plaintiff's coun·

sel objected that Dr. Nelson was a surprise witness and that,~
any case, he could only testify to rebut the testimony of Mr.
Dyson.

t Tr • , p • 17 3 8 j

•
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Mr. Slagle acknowledged that Dr. Nelson was not listed as

a witness but it was pointed out that Mr. Dixon, co-counsel for
Plaintiff, on the Wednesday or Thursday of the first week of
trial was informed that Dr. Nelson may be used as a rebuttal
witness and that Plaintiff had therefore known about Nelson
for two weeks.

(Tr., p. 1739).

Furthermore, Slagle stated that he never intended on using
Dr. Nelson only to rebut Dyson's testimony and that the defense
did not have to anticipate every bit of evidence that may be
used in rebuttal.

(Tr . , p . 1 7 3 9 ) .

After being told by Plaintiff's counsel that Judge Baldwin
ordered that no other witnesses except those exchanged could be
called at trial, the court replied:
Well, even if the court did order that, I presume that one is entitled to bring on any other
witnesses he may desire in connection with the
matter in rebuttal if its necessary. I don't
think anybody is precluded if the exigencies
of the situation were to indicate it such being
the case.

*

*

*

I suppose if there was something testified to,
and there is the desire to rebut it, I suppose
that is an exigency that may arise.

*

*

*

Well, the court is not going to preclude him
from presenting his evidence if he believes
that it's necessary to present it.
(Tr., PP·
1740).

Thus, the conference at trial revealed that Plaintiff was
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aware of Dr. Nelson's possible testimony two weeks pri'or

to his

being called and that the trial court never limited hi s t estimony to strictly rebuttal of Mr. Dyson's testimony.

(Appellant'

brief, p. 46).
Appellant cites the case of Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d
909

(Ala. 1967) in support of his position that a pretrial or-

der has to be followed precisely by the trial court.

In that

case, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated that a trial
court is still left with discretion as to whether a witness
should be excluded from trial if not listed in a pretrial order,
The court stated:
Whether or not we will interfere with such
discretion as in other cases where discretion is involved, depends on whether the discretion was abused, which would be the case
only if we were left with the definite and
firm conviction on the record that the judge
had made a mistake in deciding as he did to
exclude or not to exclude a witness not listed in accordance with the order for a pretrial conference.
Id. at 917.
Even assuming arguendo that Judge Baldwin required all wit·
nesses to be listed at the pretrial conference and stated t~t
no surprise witnesses would be allowed, the trial court had dis·
cretion to decide whether a witness was a "surprise" and discre·
tion as to the scope of the witness's testimony.

The record

shows that the trial court did not abuse this discretion.
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86

(Utah 1963).
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POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE DR.
RUSSELL NELSON.
Appellant devotes a significant number of pages in his
brief to support and acclaim the virtues of cross examination.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 48-59).

Respondent basically agrees

with all of the legal authorities cited by Appellant and concurs
that cross examination is an essential tool at any trial.
However, when these legal principles are specifically applied to the facts of this case it becomes evident that no right
of cross examination was denied.
Appellant complains that he was unable to cross examine
Dr. Russell Nelson as to whether he performed surgery in the
same way described in the hypothetical.

(Tr., p. 1747).

Appel-

lant states that this question "went to the heart of the witness's
testimony, the standard of care by which the defendant's conduct
was to be judged."

(Appellant's brief, pp. 53-54).

It was established many years ago that what an individual
physician does in his medical practice is irrelevant and immaterial to how another physician performs in his practice.

The

Utah Supreme Court said:
The witness was asked to give his opinion of
various steps in the method of treatment adopted
by Dr. Shields and then to give his opinion of
the method as a whole. To pennit him to answer
sets his opinion up as a basis from which to
determine whether Dr. Shields was negligent or
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not.
It is an effort to set off or.e opinion against another as proof of error in the
latter, whereas the standard of care resuired
of a surgeon is that he exercise the reasonable care, skill, and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by--not one surgeon--but surgeons generally, not ~o mention for the moment,
the question of restricting the general group
to any particular community or locality.
It
is our opinion that the questions were fatally
defective by reason of calling for a comparison with only one opinion rather than a general group. And the lower court was correct
in ruling the answers out. Coon v. Shields,
39 P.2d 348 (Utah 1934) (Emphasis added).
Thus, Dr. Nelson's personal practice and manner in which hE
performs surgery is immaterial and irrelevant as to a direct
comparison with the practices of Dr. Parrish.

Had Dr. Nelson,

however, "testified previously that he based his opinion"
as to the standard of practice in Salt Lake City in 1972 upon
his own practice as well as the practice of other doctors it
probably would have been proper to inquire further as to the
foundation of his opinion.
The record is void of any reference as to what elements
comprised the standard in which he formulated.

For this reason,

the question as asked was irrelevant to the formulation of the
standard which Dr. Nelson had previously related.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in decid·
ing whether evidence submitted is relevant.
thers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).

Barnbrough v. Be-

In ruling upon questions

during the examination of witnesses, and more particularly the
cross examination, the trial court has considerable latitude,
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and its rulings will not be held to be reversible error unless
it appears that they are clearly erroneous and, generally
speaking, prejudicial.

Good v. West Seattle Gen. Hosp. Corp.

335 P. 2d 590, 593 (Wash. 1959).
As stated previously, the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the question of Dr. Nelson's personal practice was irrelevant to the establislunent of the community standard without a showing that this was a factor comprising the
opinion.

In addition, the failure to answer the question was

not prejudicial since Plaintiff effectively obtained the answer
from Dr. Nelson in the questions following the cited question.
The following dialogue occurred:
Q

(By Mr. Dixon) Dr. Nelson, did--have
you reviewed vividly the practices of
the other doctors in the community to
determine whether or not they were
practicing surgery in the same way that
was described in that hypothetical?

A

I've been doing heart surgery here for
22 years and am pretty well acquainted
with the work of the others in the
area.

Q

And did they generally practice the
same way you do?

A

surgeons are like concert pianists;
each one is highly individual, highly
different, and yet obedient to certain
basic rules.

Q

One of those basic rules is that the
body needs a certain amount of oxygenation; isn't that correct?
-49-
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A

But the defining of that limit is subject to a good deal of dispute.
(Tr.,
p. 1747).

The doctor, in effect, admitted that he practiced in the
same way as other doctors in ,the community and then proceeded
to explain the certain "basic rules" as propounded by Plaintiff's attorney.

(Tr . , pp • 1747-1762 ) •

Plaintiff's counsel thoroughly examined Dr. Nelson's testimony as to how open-heart surgery should be performed and
such testimony was clearly based upon the doctor's own opinion
and experience.
Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to allow the question as framed to be answered but in still per
mitting examination of Dr. Nelson's personal practice and
opinions as to the standard of open-heart surgery.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the trial court did not err or abuse its discre
in the selection of jurors, the admissability of testimony, the
procedures and substance of jury instructions, or in trial proc
generally.
For the reasons outlined in this brief, the judgment of the
jury should be affirmed.
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